I am a Director with the Virginia Blockchain Council. We believe that it is important to have this BILL pass. We think that it is important to have legal structure and framework for DAOs. For several reasons. Guidelines for the structures to operate. This allows accountability and enforcement. Allows DOAs to be recognized by the courts in dealing in contract s. Also there are great use cases needed for this structure including but not limited to underserved communities that can benefit by having access to DOAs for community-driven initiatives like managing public resources or funding social projects. We also believe that Virginia believes in innovation and keeping its citizen at the forefront of change and Giving the State a competitive edge. We support this BILL.

I am against this bill which aims to create a regulatory framework for decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) in Virginia. Regulatory Complexity: Introducing a new legal entity structure like DAOs adds complexity to Virginia's corporate law landscape. This could complicate the regulatory environment, making it harder for businesses and regulators to navigate, especially given the unique nature of DAOs which operate via blockchain technology and smart contracts. Legal Ambiguity: The integration of smart contracts into corporate governance introduces legal ambiguities. Smart contracts, being self-executing, might not align well with traditional legal frameworks, potentially leading to disputes over interpretation, enforcement, and liability that current laws are not equipped to handle. Security and Fraud Risks: DAOs, due to their decentralized nature, are susceptible to security breaches and fraud, as seen in past incidents like The DAO hack. The regulatory framework might not sufficiently address these risks, leaving investors and participants vulnerable without clear legal recourse. Member Rights and Responsibilities: The bill's provisions on member rights within DAOs could be challenging to enforce in a decentralized setting where traditional corporate governance structures do not apply, potentially leading to confusion over accountability, decision-making, and profit distribution. Dissolution Challenges: The process for dissolving a DAO, as outlined, might not account for the technical challenges of unwinding blockchain-based entities, where assets might be locked in smart contracts or distributed across a global network, complicating asset recovery and closure. Innovation vs. Regulation: While DAOs represent innovation in corporate structures, premature or overly rigid regulation could stifle this innovation. The technology and operational models of DAOs are still evolving, and a fixed legal framework might not adapt well to future developments. Delayed Effective Date: The delay until January 1, 2026, might seem beneficial for preparation, but it could also mean that by the time the framework is implemented, the technology or market dynamics of DAOs might have significantly changed, rendering parts of the regulation obsolete or inadequate. Global Nature of DAOs: DAOs often operate on a global scale, and state-specific regulations might not effectively govern entities that can exist and operate outside traditional jurisdictional boundaries, potentially reducing the effectiveness of Virginia's regulatory oversight. Precedent for Other States: By being one of the first to regulate DAOs, Virginia might set a precedent that other states follow, potentially leading to a patchwork of state laws that could complicate the operation of DAOs across the U.S., affecting their scalability and interoperability. I oppose this legislation due to concerns over regulatory complexity, legal ambiguity, security risks, the challenge of defining member rights in a decentralized context, dissolution issues, the balance between innovation and regulation, potential obsolescence, the global nature of DAOs, and the precedent it might set for other jurisdictions. A more cautious, flexible approach allowing for the evolution of both technology and law might be more appropriate.

I disagree with this bill which aims to restrict minors' access to social media accounts between 12:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. without parental permission for several reasons: Lack of Specific Parental Control Options: One major flaw in this legislation is the absence of specific parental control options for setting personalized time restrictions on online platforms. Parents might need different time frames based on their child's schedule, school nights vs. weekends, or special circumstances like time zone differences for families with international connections. The bill's one-size-fits-all approach from 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. does not accommodate these nuances, limiting parents' ability to tailor restrictions to fit their family's unique needs. Overly Broad and Inflexible: The fixed time restriction might not suit all families or situations, making the law overly broad and inflexible. For instance, some minors might have legitimate reasons to be online during these hours, like participating in global educational projects or connecting with family abroad. Enforcement Challenges: Ensuring compliance with this law would be challenging for commercial entities. Determining the age of users and managing permissions from parents across different time zones or varying legal guardianship situations adds complexity, potentially leading to errors or oversights. Potential for Circumvention: Minors could find ways around these restrictions, such as using VPNs or accessing social media through different devices or accounts not linked to their primary profiles, thus rendering the law less effective. Civil Liability Concerns: The introduction of civil liability for damages related to sleep cycle or mental health could lead to a flood of lawsuits, many of which might be difficult to prove causation, creating a legal and financial burden on social media companies, which might not directly correlate with the intended protection of minors. Privacy Issues: To enforce such a law, social media platforms might need to collect and store more personal information about users' ages and parental consents, raising privacy concerns, especially for minors. Impact on Parental Responsibility: This bill might inadvertently reduce the perceived responsibility of parents in managing their children's online activities, suggesting that regulation can replace parental oversight, which is not always the case. Missed Opportunity for Education: Instead of restrictive measures, the legislation misses an opportunity to promote digital literacy and responsible online behavior through education, which could be more beneficial in the long term for both minors and their mental health. I oppose this legislation due to its lack of flexibility in parental control options, broad and inflexible time restrictions, enforcement difficulties, potential circumvention, civil liability issues, privacy concerns, the impact on parental responsibility, and the missed opportunity for educational approaches to online safety. A more nuanced strategy that includes customizable parental controls and education would better serve the goal of protecting minors' well-being.

Comments Document

TechNet HB 1816 remarks are attached.

I hope I understand this bill correctly. I believe it is protecting our kids from being exposed to inappropriate content such as weed, cigarettes, and sexual material? If that’s the case, then why are Democrats legalizing cannabis? Why lower expectations and standards in schools because that is what keeps happening from the far-left Democrat Party. I don’t want to see these inappropriate things myself. Nothing is safe for our children and young adults. I am This begins with the family and following the Rule of Law.

Comments Document

TechNet's written remarks on HB 1816 - restricted hours for minors - are attached.

Nick Gatz, Adobe

I disagree with this bill for several reasons: First Amendment: It might infringe on free speech rights, similar to concerns in Citizens United v. FEC (2010). Regulatory Overreach: Mandating provenance data could stifle AI innovation, echoing Lochner v. New York (1905). Privacy Concerns: Data retention requirements raise privacy issues, akin to Carpenter v. United States (2018). Federal Preemption: State law might conflict with federal regulations, as in Arizona v. United States (2012). Enforcement: Exclusive AG enforcement could lead to selective application, referencing United States v. Armstrong (1996). Tech Feasibility: Default provenance tools in devices might not be feasible, like in State Farm (1983). Commerce Clause: Could affect interstate commerce, per Gibbons v. Ogden (1824). Jurisdiction: AI regulation might better suit federal oversight, as per Wickard v. Filburn (1942). Innovation: Risks stifling tech innovation, similar to Lorillard v. Reilly (2001). I oppose this due to potential free speech violations, regulatory overreach, privacy issues, federal-state conflicts, enforcement concerns, technological challenges, commerce implications, jurisdictional issues, and innovation hindrance.

Comments Document

TechNet's written remarks on HB 2121 are attached.

I am against this bill which expands defamation laws to include synthetic digital content and introduces new penalties, considering the following legal precedents and concerns: First Amendment: The expansion of defamation laws to synthetic content could infringe on free speech, as the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) set a high bar for defamation claims to protect free expression. This bill might lower that threshold, potentially chilling legitimate speech. Vagueness Doctrine: The definition and application of "synthetic digital content" might be too broad or vague, risking violation of the void for vagueness doctrine, as seen in Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), where laws must be clear to avoid arbitrary enforcement. Criminalization of Speech: By making the use of synthetic content for fraud a Class 1 misdemeanor, the bill treads into the area of criminalizing speech, which could conflict with United States v. Stevens (2010), where the Court struck down a law for overbroad criminalization of speech. Double Jeopardy: Imposing a separate penalty for using synthetic content in fraud might raise double jeopardy concerns, similar to issues discussed in Blockburger v. United States (1932), where multiple punishments for the same act are scrutinized. Civil Liability Expansion: Allowing individuals depicted in synthetic content to sue for damages could lead to an expansion of civil liability, potentially conflicting with Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), where the Court protected parody and satire under the First Amendment, which might extend to some forms of synthetic content. Precedent of Overregulation: This bill might set a precedent for overregulation of digital content, similar to concerns in Reno v. ACLU (1997), where broad internet regulations were found unconstitutional for stifling free speech. Work Group Overreach: The Attorney General convening a work group to study enforcement might lead to recommendations for further regulation, echoing the regulatory overreach criticized in Lochner v. New York (1905), where excessive government intervention in private matters was rebuked. Privacy and Publicity Rights: While seeking to protect individuals, this bill might inadvertently complicate privacy and publicity rights, as seen in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. (1977), where the right of publicity was upheld, potentially leading to conflicts in how synthetic content is regulated. I oppose this legislation due to potential First Amendment violations, vagueness in law, criminalization of speech, double jeopardy issues, expanded civil liability, the risk of regulatory overreach, and complications with privacy and publicity rights, advocating for a more nuanced approach that balances protection against fraud with freedom of expression.

Comments Document

TechNet's written remarks on HB 2124 are attached.

I am against this bill which expands the duties of the Division of Consumer Counsel to include programs against AI fraud and abuse, based on legal precedents and concerns: Scope of Authority: This expansion might exceed the Division's traditional scope, similar to issues in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. (2001), where the delegation of legislative power was scrutinized. The Division's role might not be suited for tech-specific issues like AI fraud. Regulatory Overreach: By establishing a statewide alert system for AI fraud, this could be seen as an overreach, echoing concerns from Lochner v. New York (1905) about government intervention in areas outside its expertise, potentially stifling innovation or creating unnecessary bureaucracy. First Amendment: Programs targeting AI content might infringe on free speech, as seen in United States v. Alvarez (2012), where the Court protected false statements under the First Amendment, questioning how broadly 'fraud and abuse' could be interpreted without impacting legitimate speech. Vagueness: The terms 'fraud and abuse' related to AI might be too vague, risking a violation of the void for vagueness doctrine from Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926), where laws must provide clear standards to avoid arbitrary enforcement. Privacy Concerns: Implementing an alert system could lead to privacy issues, reminiscent of Katz v. United States (1967), where the expectation of privacy was upheld. Monitoring AI use might require surveillance that could infringe on personal privacy. Preemption by Federal Law: Given the federal interest in regulating technology and fraud, this state initiative might face preemption issues, as in Arizona v. United States (2012), where state laws conflicting with federal authority were invalidated. Resource Allocation: Expanding the Division's duties might divert resources from its core functions, akin to the concerns in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) regarding agency focus, potentially reducing effectiveness in traditional consumer protection areas. Legal Liability: The Division might face increased legal liability or challenges in defining what constitutes AI fraud, similar to the complexities in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980) regarding commercial speech regulation, where clarity and justification are required. I oppose this legislation due to concerns over the scope of authority, regulatory overreach, First Amendment implications, legal vagueness, privacy issues, potential federal preemption, resource misallocation, and increased legal liability, suggesting a more focused role for the Division or alternative solutions that respect legal boundaries and consumer rights.

I am against this bill which proposes changes to the Information Technology Access Act regarding digital accessibility, considering legal and practical concerns: Federal Preemption: The bill might conflict with federal standards like the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, as discussed in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (2001), where state laws must not undermine federal accessibility standards, potentially leading to legal challenges. Vagueness and Overbreadth: The definition of "information and communications technology" could be too broad or vague, risking violation of the void for vagueness doctrine from Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926), where laws must be clear to avoid arbitrary enforcement, especially in defining what constitutes digital accessibility for all disabilities. Administrative Burden: Designating a digital accessibility coordinator in each covered entity adds significant administrative overhead, similar to the concerns raised in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) regarding agency resource allocation, potentially diverting focus from other critical functions. Compliance Costs: Implementing comprehensive digital accessibility policies could impose substantial costs on entities, echoing economic concerns from Lochner v. New York (1905) about government regulations that might unfairly burden businesses, particularly smaller entities or those in less populated areas. Delayed Implementation: The staggered effective dates might lead to inequity in accessibility, where some populations receive benefits later than others, potentially conflicting with the equal protection principles discussed in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), albeit in a different context. Enforcement Challenges: Ensuring compliance across various entities could be logistically challenging, akin to issues in Wyoming v. Oklahoma (1992) regarding state enforcement capabilities, where uniform application might be difficult, leading to inconsistent accessibility standards. Privacy Concerns: The role of digital accessibility coordinators might involve collecting and managing personal data related to disabilities, raising privacy issues similar to those in Carpenter v. United States (2018), where the handling of personal information was scrutinized. One-Size-Fits-All Approach: A uniform policy might not cater to the diverse needs of different disabilities, potentially not meeting the individualized assessment standard set by Olmstead v. L.C. (1999), which emphasized tailored accommodations. I oppose this legislation due to potential conflicts with federal laws, vagueness in definitions, increased administrative burdens, compliance costs, delayed and inequitable implementation, enforcement challenges, privacy issues, and the risk of a one-size-fits-all approach not adequately addressing the spectrum of disabilities, advocating for a more nuanced, resource-conscious, and privacy-respecting approach to digital accessibility.

I am against this bill, the Artificial Intelligence Transparency Act, due to several legal and practical concerns: First Amendment: Mandating disclosures on AI-generated content could be seen as compelled speech, potentially infringing on free speech rights, as discussed in Wooley v. Maynard (1977), where the Court ruled against compelled speech that conflicts with personal beliefs. This requirement might limit the creative freedom of AI developers. Vagueness: The bill's requirements for what constitutes "clear and conspicuous disclosure" might be too vague, risking violation of the void for vagueness doctrine from Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), where laws must provide clear guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Regulatory Overreach: Imposing such detailed regulations on AI content creation could be seen as an overreach, similar to concerns in Lochner v. New York (1905) about government intrusion into private business practices, potentially stifling innovation in AI technology. Commerce Clause: By regulating AI systems available in Virginia, this bill might affect interstate commerce, raising issues under the Commerce Clause, as in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), where state laws impacting national commerce were scrutinized. Enforcement Challenges: The requirement for developers and licensees to implement procedures to prevent undisclosed use of AI systems could be logistically challenging, echoing enforcement difficulties noted in Wyoming v. Oklahoma (1992), where uniform state enforcement across different entities was problematic. Consumer Protection Act Application: Classifying non-compliance as a prohibited practice under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act might expand the act beyond its intended scope, similar to the expansion concerns in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980), where commercial speech regulation was at issue. Right to Cure: While offering a right to cure might seem fair, it could lead to inconsistent enforcement, akin to the prosecutorial discretion issues in United States v. Armstrong (1996), where fairness in legal proceedings was a concern. Private Right of Action: Allowing individuals to sue for damages or relief might lead to a surge in litigation, potentially overwhelming the legal system, similar to the floodgate concerns in Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants (2015), where broad liability could lead to numerous claims. Privacy and Data Handling: Implementing tracking or disclosure mechanisms might require collecting user data, raising privacy issues as seen in Carpenter v. United States (2018), where the handling of personal information was scrutinized. I oppose this legislation due to potential First Amendment violations, regulatory vagueness, overreach, commerce clause conflicts, enforcement challenges, expansion of consumer protection laws, inconsistent enforcement through the right to cure, the risk of excessive litigation, and privacy concerns, advocating for a more balanced approach that encourages transparency without unduly burdening developers or infringing on rights.

Comments Document

TechNet's written remarks on HB 2554 are attached.

This bill is significantly important to protect Virginian’s data and the critical infrastructure that supports our daily lives.

This bill is extremely important to protect Virginia’s data as well as support the defense of our nation. We need to protect data centers, telecommunications systems and equipment, and the hardware and software within the critical infrastructure (e.g. power grid) from adversary access.

I am in favor of this bill which aims to protect Virginia's information security by restricting transactions with foreign adversaries. Here's why: National Security: By prohibiting the use of technology and services from entities linked to foreign adversaries, this bill directly contributes to safeguarding national security, ensuring that sensitive information and critical infrastructure are not compromised. Preventing Espionage: This legislation helps in preventing potential espionage or cyber-attacks by limiting access to systems that could be used maliciously against state interests, reinforcing Virginia's cybersecurity posture. Compliance with Federal Standards: Aligning with federal determinations from agencies like the Department of Commerce and Homeland Security ensures that Virginia's approach to technology procurement is consistent with national security strategies, promoting a unified front against threats. Public Safety: By controlling the use of potentially risky technology, the bill enhances public safety by reducing the likelihood of data breaches or disruptions that could affect public services or personal information. Support for Law Enforcement: The provision for exceptions in law enforcement matters ensures that necessary tools and technologies can still be utilized for investigative and protective purposes, balancing security with operational needs. Economic Protection: This measure protects local businesses and public bodies from unknowingly engaging with technologies that might later be deemed insecure, thus safeguarding economic interests by preventing potential fallout from security incidents. Proactive Cybersecurity: Establishing a list of prohibited technologies encourages a proactive approach to cybersecurity, prompting entities to review and secure their supply chains, which is a forward-thinking strategy in today's digital threat landscape. I support this legislation for its comprehensive approach to enhancing security, aligning with federal standards, protecting public and economic interests, and providing necessary exceptions for law enforcement, all while fostering a proactive cybersecurity environment in Virginia.