I am against this bill which expands the duties of the Division of Consumer Counsel to include programs against AI fraud and abuse, based on legal precedents and concerns:
Scope of Authority: This expansion might exceed the Division's traditional scope, similar to issues in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. (2001), where the delegation of legislative power was scrutinized. The Division's role might not be suited for tech-specific issues like AI fraud.
Regulatory Overreach: By establishing a statewide alert system for AI fraud, this could be seen as an overreach, echoing concerns from Lochner v. New York (1905) about government intervention in areas outside its expertise, potentially stifling innovation or creating unnecessary bureaucracy.
First Amendment: Programs targeting AI content might infringe on free speech, as seen in United States v. Alvarez (2012), where the Court protected false statements under the First Amendment, questioning how broadly 'fraud and abuse' could be interpreted without impacting legitimate speech.
Vagueness: The terms 'fraud and abuse' related to AI might be too vague, risking a violation of the void for vagueness doctrine from Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926), where laws must provide clear standards to avoid arbitrary enforcement.
Privacy Concerns: Implementing an alert system could lead to privacy issues, reminiscent of Katz v. United States (1967), where the expectation of privacy was upheld. Monitoring AI use might require surveillance that could infringe on personal privacy.
Preemption by Federal Law: Given the federal interest in regulating technology and fraud, this state initiative might face preemption issues, as in Arizona v. United States (2012), where state laws conflicting with federal authority were invalidated.
Resource Allocation: Expanding the Division's duties might divert resources from its core functions, akin to the concerns in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) regarding agency focus, potentially reducing effectiveness in traditional consumer protection areas.
Legal Liability: The Division might face increased legal liability or challenges in defining what constitutes AI fraud, similar to the complexities in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980) regarding commercial speech regulation, where clarity and justification are required.
I oppose this legislation due to concerns over the scope of authority, regulatory overreach, First Amendment implications, legal vagueness, privacy issues, potential federal preemption, resource misallocation, and increased legal liability, suggesting a more focused role for the Division or alternative solutions that respect legal boundaries and consumer rights.
I am against this bill which expands the duties of the Division of Consumer Counsel to include programs against AI fraud and abuse, based on legal precedents and concerns: Scope of Authority: This expansion might exceed the Division's traditional scope, similar to issues in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. (2001), where the delegation of legislative power was scrutinized. The Division's role might not be suited for tech-specific issues like AI fraud. Regulatory Overreach: By establishing a statewide alert system for AI fraud, this could be seen as an overreach, echoing concerns from Lochner v. New York (1905) about government intervention in areas outside its expertise, potentially stifling innovation or creating unnecessary bureaucracy. First Amendment: Programs targeting AI content might infringe on free speech, as seen in United States v. Alvarez (2012), where the Court protected false statements under the First Amendment, questioning how broadly 'fraud and abuse' could be interpreted without impacting legitimate speech. Vagueness: The terms 'fraud and abuse' related to AI might be too vague, risking a violation of the void for vagueness doctrine from Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926), where laws must provide clear standards to avoid arbitrary enforcement. Privacy Concerns: Implementing an alert system could lead to privacy issues, reminiscent of Katz v. United States (1967), where the expectation of privacy was upheld. Monitoring AI use might require surveillance that could infringe on personal privacy. Preemption by Federal Law: Given the federal interest in regulating technology and fraud, this state initiative might face preemption issues, as in Arizona v. United States (2012), where state laws conflicting with federal authority were invalidated. Resource Allocation: Expanding the Division's duties might divert resources from its core functions, akin to the concerns in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) regarding agency focus, potentially reducing effectiveness in traditional consumer protection areas. Legal Liability: The Division might face increased legal liability or challenges in defining what constitutes AI fraud, similar to the complexities in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980) regarding commercial speech regulation, where clarity and justification are required. I oppose this legislation due to concerns over the scope of authority, regulatory overreach, First Amendment implications, legal vagueness, privacy issues, potential federal preemption, resource misallocation, and increased legal liability, suggesting a more focused role for the Division or alternative solutions that respect legal boundaries and consumer rights.