Senate bill 128 was weakened by the senate committee on commerce and labor by adding section h. The way that the house committee had written it was more concise and generally in line with competition from non-compete bans in DC and Maryland with the salary cap. I am hopeful that the committee can work this bill back towards the way hb627 was amended. This helps healthcare professionals like myself. I am a licensed clinical social worker in a non-compete currently. This bill would allow me to leave my group and also allow my clients to not have to change therapists. Client self determination matters ethically and morally, as the potential for clients to be adversely impacted by losing their therapist is high. Therapy is an arena in which clients develop deep meaningful bonds with their therapist, and non-competes remove the ability of clients to work with therapists they have learned to trust, and adversely impacts mental health outcomes when therapists need to leave or get a new job. I am hopeful the committee will amend sb128 to be more in line with the house language that passed with hb627. Thank you.

I write in strong support of SB 128 and HB627, which seek to eliminate non-compete clauses for healthcare providers in the Commonwealth. These bills represent a necessary and long-overdue step toward protecting patient access, strengthening the healthcare workforce, and stabilizing rural healthcare systems—particularly in Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs) in the Commonwealth. In practice, restrictive covenants in rural areas within Virginia reduce access to care, exacerbate workforce shortages, and harm the very patient populations these organizations exist to serve. When a healthcare system controlling a dominant share of the local market enforces a non-compete clause, providers who leave are effectively forced to leave the community altogether. In rural areas where a single system may serve 80–90% of the patient population in a given specialty, the loss of even one clinician can have devastating downstream effects: increased wait times, reduced continuity of care, overextended remaining staff, and worsening outcomes for patients with chronic and complex conditions. Arguments in defense of non-compete clauses—that they are necessary for recruitment, retention, or financial viability—are not supported by empirical evidence. Peer-reviewed organizational and health economics literature demonstrates that restrictive covenants reduce job mobility, suppress wage growth, and contribute to burnout, moral injury, and turnover intention among healthcare workers. These effects are especially pronounced in rural settings where professional isolation and resource constraints are already significant. From an economic standpoint, non-competes also distort local healthcare markets. Limiting provider mobility suppresses competition, encourages consolidation and monopoly-like conditions, stifles innovation in care delivery, and ultimately increases costs to patients. Competition—when responsibly regulated—is not a threat to rural healthcare systems; it is a mechanism for improving quality, responsiveness, and sustainability.